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Non-reductionist science: Assessing metabolism and entropy with Systems Theory
and Hegelian Logic
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Abstract
This paper will offer Hegelian logic, its connection with systems theory, and how it can
serve as a replacement for reductionism in the sciences. First, the connection will be made
between formal logic and reductionism. Second, systems theory will be introduced as an
alternative to reductionism. Third, Hegelian logic and its connection with systems theory will be
demonstrated. Fourth, a non-reductionist mode of science will be offered, wherein Hegelian
logic and systems theory can work alone or together, in replacement of reductionism and formal
logic. Last, a brief sample of this mode of science will be shown in an examination of the
relationship between metabolism and entropy.
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I.

Reductionism

Reductionism and formal logic are two mechanical modes of thought. The former is
partly a consequence of the latter. In 1085, the first European conquest of a major Islamic city
occurred, that of Alhambra (present day Toledo, Spain). In this city was a library containing
more books than the entirety of Europe. Subsequent was Europe's adoption of the knowledge
written in these books, including logic. This influenced Europe in a number of ways, including
● criminal justice: before logic, crime investigators could only take the word of a witness
who saw the entire crime occur. With logic, however, Europeans could now gather
multiple witnesses, each of whom witnessed a small selection of the crime; from this
data, crime investigators could use logic to connect the various points of the crime and
conclude how the crime happened (Sapolsky, 2011, 8:40).
● theology: Aquinas proclaimed (even) God must obey logic1 (Sapolsky, 2011, 7:35).
● science and technology: measurement sought to be exact by, for example, inventing
measuring tools to eliminate human variability (Sapolsky, 2011, 17:35).
● culture: logic pervaded European civilization, including but not limited to criminal justice
systems, theology, science, and technology, which inevitably influences culture.
With logic came linear thinking, breaking wholes into parts, and reductionism. It was a daunting
task to draw scientific conclusions about a complex system, but isolating parts of wholes made
the system accessible to logic, for it is possible to apply logic to each part of the system. From
this, additivity and extrapolation followed: once a logical truth is deduced, it can be combined
with other information to find larger truths. Science now accounted for variability by regarding

1

“Since the principles of some sciences, as logic, geometry, and arithmetic, rest on the formal, or
abstract, constituents on which the essence of a thing depends, it follows that God cannot effect anything
contrary to these principles, as that genus should not be predicable of species, or that lines drawn from
the centre of a circle to the circumference should not be equal” (Aquinas, 2005, 189).
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it as noise and trying to avoid it. Avoiding variability, instead of embracing it, led to further
reductionism, for example with the invention of the thermometer to take humans’ temperatures
instead of taking temperatures by hand. Thus, measurement sought to avoid variability by
becoming technical, by inventing new technologies.
Reductionism can refer to different things, all of which share characteristics, such as
simplifying complexity2 and communication between levels.3 The various forms of reductionism
include
● Ontological reductionism: which states existence is constituted of various small parts (eg.
biological systems consist of nothing but molecules and their interactions)
● Theory reductionism: which states higher level theories can be deduced from lower level
theories
● Methodological reductionism: which states science can and should explain phenomena by
isolating its parts, yielding conclusions about such parts, and yielding macro conclusions
from these micro conclusions via upward causation.
The latter two forms of reductionism may be grouped together as “epistemic reductionism.”

II.

Complexity and Hegelian logic

In the 20th century, systems began to be studied as systems under the name “systems
theory.” Similar fields emerged around the same time, such as cybernetics, network theory and
information theory.

2

For example, breaking wholes into parts.
For example, lower levels of a system (eg. cells) deliver information to upper levels (eg. a brain). This
can occur ontologically, wherein nervous system cells communicate via neurotransmitters to deliver
information to the brain. Or, this can occur theoretically wherein a methodological reductionist reduces
the brain to cells in a scientific model.
3
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‘Systems’ are a collection of interacting entities that contribute to the functioning of a
greater whole. Systems theory is antithetical to reductionism and determinism, as the former is a
holistic approach that studies interdependent systems in their relatedness. Systems theory
embraces variability, out-of-equilibrium states, continuous evolution, and unpredictability.
There are simple systems and complex systems. Simple systems, such as a car or elevator,
have few components and can be easily understood, modeled and predicted. Complex systems
are systems that are non-linear, dynamic, adaptive, emergent, spontaneous, self-organizing, and
may contain phenomena such as chaos, feedback loops, fractality and self-similarity. Examples
of complex systems include biological systems such as ecosystems, organisms, nervous systems,
living cells or the human brain, infrastructure systems such as power grids, water systems,
transportation systems, or telecommunications systems, physical systems, such as molecules in
soil or in a body of water, economic systems such as firms, markets, or economies, social systems
such as families, cities, societies, or nations, financial systems such as the system that governs
how money is borrowed, lenders cooperate or compete, and the money supply changes, and
miscellaneous systems such as computation, culture, languages, security systems, governmental
systems, the global climate, and the cosmos. One outcome of systems theory is the implication
that all systems share common behavior (since systems theory can be applied to many different
fields of study).
Key concepts of complex systems can be found in Hegel’s philosophy, particularly his
books “Science of Logic” (1812) and “Encyclopedia Logic” (1817). For example, a system can
be thought of as a determinate being with its parts being in a ‘unity of opposites’4 with each

4

‘The unity of opposites’ and similar phrases (such as ‘the unity and conflicts of opposites’ and ‘the unity
and interpretation of opposites’) were not used by Hegel, but by his later followers, namely, the Marxists.
The phrase does not catch the specifics or subtleties of Hegel’s thought, but nevertheless captures a
repeating idea immanent throughout Hegel’s logic and serves as a useful generalization of the dialectic.
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other. Each system, which is a determinate being, can have another system and therefore another
determinate being inside of it (eg. a living organism inside an ecosystem) and the laws of Hegel’s
logic can apply to each system independently; thus, systems (determinate beings inside another
determinate being) display fractality. ‘The transformation of quality into quantity and vice versa’
— where, Hegel says, change in quantity results in qualitative change and vice versa5 — is also
found in complex systems in inverse relationships,6 power laws and threshold effects.
Hegel criticizes science and logic (both formal logic and Kantian transcendental logic)
for starting with definitions and presuppositions. Moreover, the content and method of science
and logic are different.7 Science and logic start with assumptions and reach their conclusions via
argumentation (rather than via necessity), which makes scientific/logical conclusions at best
seemingly correct opinions.8

5

Quantity’s “indifferent increasing or decreasing also has a limit” (Hegel, 1991, 171). Quantity is only
indifferent to quality up to a certain point, a certain threshold. “On the one hand, quantitative
determinations of what is there can be altered, without its quality being affected thereby, but, on the other,
this indifferent increase and decrease also has a limit, the transgression of which alters the quality”
(Hegel, 1991, 171). Hegel gives the example of water (quality) and its temperature (quantity; eg. 0
degrees, 100 degrees, etc.). Cold water and warm water are of the same quality (water); but water can
be brought to a temperature so cold that it goes beyond its limit and turns into ice; when water is heated
to a temperature too hot, it will pass its limit and turn into steam (Hegel, 1991, 171).
6
For example, a consequence of quantity transforming into quality and vice versa is the inverse ratio of
factors. In this ratio, each quantum (number) is alterable and must alter in opposite directions since the
product is fixed. This means, if xy=12, and if x decreases, y must increase (Hegel, 2010, 274).
7
“In no science is the need to begin with the fact [Sache] itself, without preliminary reflections, felt more
strongly than in the science of logic. In every other science, the matter that it treats, and the scientific
method, are distinguished from each other; the content, moreover, does not make an absolute beginning
but is dependent on other concepts and is connected on all sides with other material. It is therefore
permitted to these sciences to speak of their ground and its context, as well of their method, in the form of
lemmas; to apply presupposed forms of definitions and the like without further ado, as known and
accepted; and to make use of customary ways of argumentation in order to establish their general
concepts and fundamental determinations” (Hegel, 2010, 23).
8
“There will always be the possibility that someone else will adduce a case, an instance, in which
something more and different must be understood by some term or other – a term which is therefore to be
defined in a narrower or broader sense and the science, too, will have to be refashioned accordingly. –
Further still, definition is always a matter of argumentation as to what is to be included in it or excluded
from it, within which limits and to what extent; but argumentation is open to the most manifold and various
opinions, and on these a decision can finally be determined only arbitrarily. In this method of beginning
science with a definition, no mention is made of the need to demonstrate the necessity of its subject
matter, and hence the necessity of the science itself” (Hegel, 2010, 29).
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Hegel offers a normative description of logic. Logic should not rest on mere
presuppositions and proceed according to argumentation, but rather, the factical contents of logic
must necessarily already exist within logic.9 The truth of logic manifests in the process of the
exposition into logic.10 Thus, the method of logic is thinking and its contents is thinking and
thus, Hegel avoids the mistake he sees in science, formal logic and transcendental logic, viz., that
method and content are different. So, the normative logic that Hegel offers is the thinking of
thought or the thinking of thinking.11 He proceeds to develop a detailed logic.
Hegel must avoid starting his logic from a presupposition, so he begins from the only
possible presuppositionless starting point: being or pure being.12 Being, however, is the same as
its opposite: nothing or pure nothing.13 The unity of being and nothing is becoming.14 Herein is
Hegel’s dialectic: being and nothing are in united opposition: they are opposites yet are in unity.15
Being and nothing are then sublated, meaning both being and nothing cease to be yet become
something new; in other words, they alter, they become something new and are not what they
used to be. The result is a new determination. The sublation of being and nothing is becoming.16
This dialectical movement pervades all of Hegel’s thinking.

9

“Logic, on the contrary, cannot presuppose any of these forms of reflection, these rules and laws of
thinking, for they are part of its content and they first have to be established within it” (Hegel, 2010, 23).
10
“ Logic, therefore, cannot say what it is in advance, rather does this knowledge of itself only emerge as
the final result and completion of its whole treatment” (Hegel, 2010, 23).
11
“This science [Hegel’s normative depiction of logic] is the thinking of thinking” (Hegel, 1991, 46).
12
“Pure being makes the beginning [of the logic], because it is pure thought as well as the undetermined,
simple immediate, [and because] the first beginning cannot be anything mediated and further determined”
(Hegel, 1991, 136).
13
“Pure being is the pure abstraction, and hence it is the absolutely negative, which when taken
immediately, is equally nothing” (Hegel, 1991, 139). The only difference between nothing and pure being
is that with being, “something [is] merely meant” (Hegel, 1991, 139). The distinction between being and
nothing is “a completely abstract distinction, one that is at the same time no distinction” (Hegel, 1991,
140)
14
“This unity [of being and nothing] is becoming” (Hegel, 1991, 141).
15
This principle is referred to as ‘the unity of opposites’ by later Hegelians, namely, the Marxists.
16
“In becoming, being, as one with nothing, and nothing as one with being, are only vanishing [terms];
because of its contradiction becoming collapses inwardly, into the unity within which both are subltated; in
this way its result is being-there” (Hegel, 1991, 145).
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Hegel’s logic starts with pure being and pure nothing, which are undetermined, but their
result, becoming, is determined, for becoming is a something and necessarily has quality; in
other words, a something, by definition, has content, properties, attributes. A something is not
pure being, but rather a determinate being. A something, as a specific, determined thing, is
distinct from what it is not, distinct from an other. A something necessarily has a limit17 and an
other.18
Quality is identical with being, for “something ceases to be what it is if it loses its
quality” (Hegel, 1991, 136). Quantity is external from and indifferent to quality19 up to a limit.20
Once a threshold, a limit is surpassed, quality changes. Hegel gives the example of water
(quality) and its temperature (quantity; eg. 0 degrees, 100 degrees, etc.). Cold water and warm
water are of the same quality (water); but water can be brought to a temperature so cold that it
goes beyond its limit and turns into ice; when water is heated to a temperature too hot, it will
pass its limit and turn into steam (Hegel, 1991, 171). When quantity exceeds limit, quality is
sublated (Hegel, 1991, 172). So, a large enough change in quantity — i.e., a change that exceeds
the quantity’s limit — results in a necessary and simultaneous change in quality.
Quality and quantity are not two external existents. Initially, quality and quantity are
present as distinctions,21 “but quality is indeed in-itself quantity, and conversely, quantity is
in-itself quality, too” (Hegel, 1991, 173). Quality and quantity are related and united in

17

“Something has a quality, and in this quality it is not only determined but delimited; its quality is its limit”
(Hegel, 2010, 101).
18
“Through its quality, something is opposed to an other” (Hegel, 2021, 83).
19
Quantity “is the determination that is external to being, indifferent for it” (Hegel, 1991, 136).
20
Limit is dialectical as it contains an internal contradiction: “limit constitutes the reality of being-there,
and, on the other hand, it is the negation of it” (Hegel, 1991, 148).
21
“Quality and quantity do initially confront one another in measure like something and other” (Hegel,
1991, 173).
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measure.22 Measure “is qualitative quantity” (Hegel, 1991, 136). Everything is quantitatively
determined and as such has measure.
Hegel’s logic proceeds to complete a metaphysical system, but the summary of his logic
thus far is sufficient for the purpose of this paper.
As formal logic mirrors reductionism, Hegelian logic mirrors complexity and systems
theory. Formal logic and reductionism are mechanistic world views and the latter is partly a
historical consequence of the former. Systems theory and Hegelian logic, by contrast, are
non-mechanistic and treat the world as if it is a set of constantly evolving complex systems and
studies this complex world with appropriate tools.
Newton’s first law of motion states bodies at rest remain at rest and bodies in motion
remain in motion. In mainstream economics, economic or financial crises are seen as anomalies.
Reductionism treats stasis and equilibrium as the normal and desired state and treats
out-of-equilibrium states as anomalies and disasters. In systems theory, however, such anomalies
or “disasters” are seen as naturally occurring phenomena that are systemic or cyclical by nature.
In Hegelian logic, stability is seen as opposing forces temporarily in balance. Thus, for
reductionism, change is an anomaly in a static world. For systems theory and Hegelian logic,
antithetically, stability is a special and temporary case in a constantly changing and random
world.

III.

Non-reductionism: systems theory versus Hegelian logic

The world view in the West, toward the sciences otherwise, was mechanistic with formal
logic and reductionism until logic was revolutionized by Hegel and science and its methods were

22

The unity and truth of quality and quantity is “qualitative quantity or measure” (Hegel, 1991, 169).
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revolutionized by complexity and the methods of studying complexity, namely, systems theory,
cybernetics, network theory and information theory.
Hegelian logic is partly compatible with systems theory. They both study complexity and
can account for things such as contingency, constant evolution, inverse relations, power laws,
threshold effects, and fractality. Hegelian logic and systems theory can both be used to do
science. They can be employed simultaneously.
Hegelian logic and systems theory are not fully compatible, though. They each have their
strengths. Systems theory’s strength is its mathematical apparatus. Systems theory tenets certain
equations are, within limits, adequate to address systems. Mathematical systems theory will
define a set of variables and interrelations and, from given initial conditions, predict future
behavior of the variables. If variables transcend boundaries, this can mean either there is a shock
disrupting the system or the equations are no longer valid. Thus, systems theory cannot account
for models’ variables qualitatively changing (as Hegelian logic can). Hegelian logic has its
strong suits in its ability to account for a number of things — necessity,23
negation/contradiction/opposition, sublation and transformation, and arguably other concepts24
— in a way systems theory does not. Consequently, Hegelian logic is more adequate to account
for systems’ whole-part relations for two reasons:
1) Hegelian logic accounts for both wholes and their parts, but does not privilege the parts,
as reductionism is guilty of, nor privileges the wholes, as holism might; and

23

Necessity is a key concept for Hegel as he thinks his logic is based on necessity and not, as is the case
of science or formal logic, based on argumentation from presuppositions. Systems theory does not
account for necessity in this way; it has no explicit treatment of the concept of necessity.
24
The Hegelian (Marxist) biologist Mary Boger says, albeit systems theory is concerned with process,
complexity, and interconnection, it cannot account for dialectical contingency, historicity, mediation or
contradiction (Levins, 1998, 376). Although she is correct Hegel explicitly accounts for these concepts in
a unique and subtly rich manner, I do not see in a direct or practical way how Hegel’s account of
contingency and historicity is opposed to and superior to systems theory in conducting science.
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2) Hegelian logic can account for change with respect to other change, for example, an
organism’s change in response to environmental change, and, simultaneously, vice versa.

IV.

Hegelian logic on the whole-part dialectic

Engles, a Hegelian philosopher, knew that nature has no “hard and fast lines” and
“either-or” is inadequate in science. In nature “all differences become merged in intermediate
steps, and all opposites pass into one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical
method of [non-dialectical] thought no longer suffices” (Engles, 1987, 493). Opposites are
unified and pass into one another in nature: excitatory and inhibitory neurons, reaction-diffusion
systems, sympathetic and parasympathetic stimulation in the nervous system, and more. Unified
opposites exist purely logically, too, for example, in categories such as cause and effect,25
necessity and chance,26 and identify and difference.27 The existence of the unity of opposites is
what logically follows from the Hegelian maxim spouted in the opening of both logical texts:
‘being and nothing are the same’. The ‘unity of opposites’ is a more developed form of ‘being
and nothing are the same’; the former takes the same form of the latter, but it is more general and
encompasses anything with the form of unified opposites (and not only the specific example of
being and nothing).
The unity of opposites is embodied in systems, wherein systems are composed of parts
and wholes and these parts and wholes are in unified opposition, meaning they necessarily exist
in unity, yet they are opposites of one another. Hegel explicitly cites whole-part relations in
Encyclopedia Logic:
25

In cause and effect, the cause is also an effect of a previous cause and an effect is a cause for a future
effect.
26
It is necessary that contingency exists.
27
For example, Hegel says the unity of opposites in identity and difference exists in every sentence
wherein the subject is the different than the predicate yet says identity; the sentence “the rose is red,”
says identity yet identifies two different things (‘rose’ and ‘red’) (Engles, 1987, 495).

12

The immediate relationship is that of the whole and the parts; the content is the whole
and consists of its opposite, i.e., of the parts (of the form). The parts are diverse from
each other and they are what is independent. But they are parts only in their identical
relation to each other, or insofar as, taken together, they constitute the whole. But the
ensemble is the opposite and negation of the part (Hegel, 1991, 204).
In the same text he states such a whole-part relationship regarding organic life. ‘An animal may,
of course, be said to “consist of” bones, muscles, nerves, etc. … [however] the various parts and
members of the organic body have their substance only in their union, and cease to exist as such
if they are separated from one another’ (Hegel, 1991, 196). In the Science of Logic he restates
the whole-part dialectic more clearly:
the whole is equal to the parts and the parts are equal to the whole… But further, the
whole is equal to the parts but not to them as parts… The whole is not equal to them as
this self-subsistent diversity but to them together. But this, their “together,” is nothing
else but their unity, the whole as such” (Hegel, 2010, 452).
In other words, the whole is equal to the parts in their (the parts) relatedness to all other parts of
the whole and wholes and their parts are in a unity of opposites.

V.

Whole-part dialectic: metabolism and environmental entropy

This section will provide a sample of how Hegelian logic can substantiate a theory of
changing entropy and metabolism in far-from-equilibrium states in open systems. The history of
biology has not addressed the relationship between organisms and environment in a dynamic
way. Pre-evolutionary biology treated the environment mostly as a place of resources (food,
shelter, etc.) for organisms, organisms which have structures to obtain these resources. After the
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theory of natural selection, the environment was viewed as an insecurity to organisms (since,
when confronted with scarce resources, predation, infection, etc., adapted organisms will survive
and reproduce while non-adapted organisms will not), organisms that must survive the
environment (Levins, 1985, 51). Both paradigms treat the organism as something active and
changing, while the environment “is passive, delineated superficially, and treated as fixed in
principle” (Levins, 1985, 52).
According to Denbeigh and Prigogine, who independently formulated entropy
relationships in dissipative systems, total entropy change is the sum of the change in the internal
production of entropy in the system (i.e., metabolism) and the change in environmental entropy
in the system (Toussaint and Schneider, 1998, 4):
dS=dSᵢ+dSₑ
So, total entropy, a ‘whole’, is necessarily related to metabolism and environmental entropy,
which are its composed ‘parts’, taking the form of the unity of opposites, thus demonstrating the
evolving and adaptive character of living subjects (parts), the environment (the whole), and their
relationship. To view one of the formula’s three components alone is impossible because each
component is definitively composed of the other two. To show mathematically, merely rearrange
the equation:
dS=dSᵢ+dSₑ ≣ dSᵢ=dSₑ−dS ≣ dSₑ=dSᵢ−dS
The outcome of this relationship is also Hegelian. Entropy increases with aging and
maximum entropy occurs with death, which exhibits the maxim Hegel spouted in both of his
logical texts that ‘life bears the germ of death’ (Hegel, 2010, 60).
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VI.

Conclusion

Reductionism and formal logic not only share characteristics, but the former is partly a
historical consequence of the latter as Europe’s re-discovery of logic led to reductionist thinking
in academia and everyday life. Breaking wholes into parts, treating parts in isolation, analyzing
parts with logic, and disregarding variability made it feasible to study complex phenomena in
criminal justice, theology, nature, technology and elsewhere.
The 20th century brought opposition to reductionism with systems theory and related
fields, which take a holistic approach to studying systems as systems of interrelated parts
functioning at local levels to yield a macro outcome. Complex systems theory embraces
variability, out-of-equilibrium and far-from-equilibrium states, dynamism, constant evolution,
adaptivity, non-linearity, and unpredictability. Complex systems theory shares similar
characteristics with Hegelian logic, which is a metaphysical system that serves as an alternative
to formal logic. Analogous to systems theory challenging reductionist thinking is Hegelian logic
challenging formal logic. A typology follows that science can be done with reductionism and
formal logic, or systems theory and Hegelian logic.28
To show an application of Hegelian logic and systems theory in biology, consider the
relationship between metabolism and environmental entropy. Metabolism is a ‘part’ and
environmental entropy is a ‘whole’, each one on their own is evolving and adapting, and their
relationship itself, which is realized in total entropy, is dynamic and, like all whole-part
relationships, necessarily consisting of unified opposites. Accordingly, a systems theory
informed with the subtleties of Hegelian logic can push science past standstills and into regions
reductionism will not.

28

This typology does not intend to imply formal logic and systems theory can never mix.

15

Bibliography
Aquinas, Thomas. (2005). Summa Contra Gentiles. The Catholic Primer’s.
https://anucs.weblogs.anu.edu.au/files/2013/11/St.-Thomas-Aquinas-The-Summa-ContraGentiles.pdf
Engles, Friedrich. (1987). The Dialectics of Nature. From Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
Collected Works, Volume 25. New York: International Publishers.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. (2010). The Science of Logic. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press. Edited and Translated by George di Giovanni.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. (1991). Encyclopedia Logic. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett
Publishing Company, Inc. Translated by T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, and H.S. Harris.
Levins, Richard. (1998). Dialectics and Systems Theory. From: Science & Society, Fall, 1998,
Vol. 62, No. 3, Dialectics: The New Frontier (Fall, 1998), pp. 375-399. Published by
Guilford Press.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40403729.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A179c6103e0d1378
bdaee1e4b69561fdc
Levins, Richard and Lewontin, Richard. (1985). The Dialectical Biologist. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Sapolsky, Robert. (2011). Chaos and Reductionism. Stanford University.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_njf8jwEGRo&t=422s
Toussaint, Olivier and Schneider, Eric D. (1998). The thermodynamics and evolution of
complexity in biological systems. Comparative Biochemistry and Physiology Part A 120
(1998) 3–9.
file:///C:/Users/tresc/Downloads/The_thermodynamics_and_evolution_of_comp.pdf

